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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
  
  he UN Secretary-General has identified enhancing humanitarian access 
as one of the five core challenges to the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict.1 In recent years considerable attention has been devoted to identi-
fying and mapping a wide range of practical constraints with respect to 
humanitarian operations and attempting to find ways of overcoming—or at 
least mitigating—their effect at field level.2 Less attention has been devoted 
to the legal framework regulating humanitarian assistance—including, in 
                                                                                                                  
1. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. S/2009/277 (May 29, 2009). This was repeated in subse-
quent reports. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. S/2010/579 (Nov. 11, 2010); U.N. Secretary-
General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, ¶ 57, U.N. 
Doc. S/2012/376 (May 22, 2012); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, ¶¶ 51–59, U.N. Doc. S/2013/689 (Nov. 22, 2013) 
[hereinafter Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2013]. 
2. For example, the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
has developed an Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework, including a database, 
based on a typology of nine different access constraints to facilitate better data collection 
and analysis and to inform policy and improve field operations’ access. OCHA Access Mon-
itoring & Reporting Framework HUMANITARIANRESPONSE.INFO, http://www.humanitarian 
response.info/system/files/documents/files/OCHA_Access_Monitoring_and_Reporting 
_Framework_OCHA_revised_May2012.pdf (last visited July 5, 2016). 
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particular, the essential starting point of humanitarian relief operations: the 
requirement of consent thereto.3 
After briefly outlining the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) 
regulating humanitarian assistance, the present article focuses on the ques-
tion of what constitutes arbitrary withholding of consent to humanitarian 
relief operations. This focus is warranted in the light of the increasing 
recognition by the international community that arbitrary denial of humani-
tarian access amounts to a violation of IHL. In its response to the conflict 
in Syria, the United Nations Security Council, in a presidential statement 
adopted in October 2013, condemned the denial by parties to the conflict 
of humanitarian access, and recalled “that arbitrarily depriving civilians of 
objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief 
supply and access, can constitute a violation of international humanitarian 
law.”4 A few months later, in Resolution 2139 of February 21, 2014, the 
Council “recall[ed] that arbitrary denial of humanitarian access and depriv-
ing civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully im-
peding relief supply and access, can constitute a violation of international 
humanitarian law.”5 The Council made similar statements in 2015 in deal-
ing with the situation in Yemen.6 Likewise, the UN General Assembly, the 
UN Human Rights Council and the UN Human Rights Committee have all 
addressed the issue of the legality of obstructions to humanitarian access in 
Syria, South Sudan and Sudan from the perspective of “arbitrary denial” of 
access.7 
                                                                                                                  
3. The rules on humanitarian relief operations raise a number of other important legal 
questions, including whose consent is required and the impact of binding Security Council 
decisions. For a fuller analysis of some of these issues, see, e.g., Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, 
The Law Regulating Cross-Border Relief Operations, 95 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 351 (2013). 
4. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2013/15 (Oct. 2, 2013).  
5. S.C. Res. 2139), pmbl., para. 5 (Feb. 21, 2014). See also S.C. Res. 2165), pmbl., para. 
15 (July 14, 2014 (Where the Council noted that it was “[d]eeply disturbed by the contin-
ued, arbitrary and unjustified withholding of consent to relief operations . . . and [also not-
ed] the United Nations Secretary-General’s view that arbitrarily withholding consent for 
the opening of all relevant border crossings is a violation of international humanitarian law 
. . . .”). 
6. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2216, pmbl., para. 10 (Apr. 14, 2015). 
7. See G.A. Res. 68/182, ¶ 14 (Dec. 18, 2013) (Syria); Human Rights Council Res. 
29/13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/29/13, ¶ 1 (July 23, 2015) (South Sudan); U.N. Human 
Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the Sudan, ¶ 8(f), 
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However, the question of what would constitute arbitrary reasons for 
withholding consent to humanitarian relief operations has not been ex-
plored in any detailed manner either in the literature nor, indeed, in prac-
tice.8 As the UN Secretary-General noted in his 2013 Report on the Protec-
tion of Civilians,9 “it is generally accepted that . . . consent [to relief opera-
tions] must not be arbitrarily withheld. . . . This area requires further analy-
sis and development in order to ensure that the law has meaning for those 
who suffer beyond the reach of assistance.” This article responds to that 
call for more detailed consideration of the issue. 
 
II.   BASIC RULES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW REGULATING 
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS 
 
The conventional rules of IHL regulating collective humanitarian relief op-
erations for civilian populations are found in different treaties, depending 
on whether the conflict is international or non–international. The rules ap-
plicable in international armed conflicts, including occupation, are found 
principally in Articles 23 and 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 
(GC IV)10 and Articles 69–71 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 (AP I).11 
Those applicable in non-international conflicts are contained in Common 
Article 3(2) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Article 18 of Addi-
tional Protocol II of 1977 (AP II).12 
Customary law rules of IHL apply alongside these treaty provisions. 
According to the ICRC’s customary law study, these treaty rules are mir-
                                                                                                                  
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SDN/CO/4  (Aug. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Fourth Periodic Report of the 
Sudan].  
8. See, however, in the context of consent to disaster relief, Sandesh Sivakumaran, 
Arbitrary withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Assistance in Situations of Disaster, 64 INTERNA-
TIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 501 (2015). 
9. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2013, supra note 1, ¶ 58.  
10. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. 
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
12. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
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rored in customary law applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflict.13  
The rules regulating humanitarian assistance are simple and essentially 
the same in both types of conflict: 
 
(i) Primary responsibility for meeting the needs of civilians lies with 
the party to the conflict in whose control they find themselves. 
States have primary responsibility to meet the needs of persons 
within their territory or effective control.14 In situations of non-
international armed conflict where organized armed groups exercise 
effective control over territory, such groups also have a duty to 
meet the needs of civilians under their control if the State with re-
sponsibility in this regard is unable to, or is precluded from, dis-
charging its obligations.15 
 
(ii) If a party with responsibility to meet the needs of a civilian 
population fails to do so, States and humanitarian organizations 
                                                                                                                  
13. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 55 ((Jean-Marie Hencka-
erts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). 
14. See generally OXFORD GUIDANCE ON THE LAW RELATING TO HUMANITARIAN 
RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT sec. B (Dapo Akande & 
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, 2016). See G.A. Res. 46/182, annex, Guiding Principles, ¶ 4 
(Dec. 19, 1991) (“Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the 
victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory.”). See also 
Francis M. Deng (Representative of the Secretary-General), Report Submitted Pursuant to 
Commission Resolution 1997/39: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-
ment] (Principle 3, ¶ 1: “National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to 
provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their 
jurisdiction.”) (Principle 25, ¶ 1: “The primary duty and responsibility for providing hu-
manitarian assistance to internally displaced persons lies with national authorities.”). 
In relation to natural disasters, see International Law Commission, Protection of Per-
sons in the Event of Disasters, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.871, at 2 (art. 2) (May 27, 2016) 
[hereinafter ILC, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters]. 
15. In recent years there has been a shift towards imputing obligations to comply with 
human rights on non-State armed groups in situations where they exercise effective con-
trol over territory and populations and discharge a degree of public and administrative 
functions. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1574, pmbl., para. 11 (Nov. 19, 2004); S.C. Res. 1376, ¶ 5 
(Nov. 9, 2001); S.C. Res. 1417, ¶ 4 (June 14, 2002). See also Walter Kälin (Representative of 
the Secretary-General), Report on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons: Addendum: 
Mission to Georgia, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.7 (Mar. 24, 2006). 
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may offer to carry out relief actions that are humanitarian and im-
partial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction.16 
 
(iii) In the majority of cases, the consent of affected States17 is re-
quired, and may not be arbitrarily withheld. There are two situa-
tions in which States have no latitude to withhold consent to hu-
manitarian relief operations: first, situations of occupation18; and, 
second, where the Security Council has adopted a binding decision 
to that effect.19 
 
(iv) Once humanitarian relief actions have been agreed to, all par-
ties must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of relief 
consignments, equipment and personnel, even if assistance is des-
tined for the civilian population under the control of the adverse 
party. Parties may prescribe technical arrangements under which 
such passage is permitted.20 
                                                                                                                  
16. See GC IV, supra note 10, art. 3(2); AP I, supra note 11, art. 70(1); AP II, supra note 
12, art. 18(2). Offers to provide assistance or to carry out other humanitarian activities 
with the consent of the parties to the conflict may also be made in other situations, includ-
ing where the civilian population is not inadequately provided with supplies essential to its 
survival. Likewise, States may also ask for assistance in such situations. GC IV, supra, arts. 
3, 10; Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
the Armed Forces in the Field arts. 3, 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter GC I]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wound-
ed, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea arts. 3, 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3217 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Convention (III) Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War arts. 3, 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [here-
inafter GC III]. Nothing precludes offers of assistance being made or, indeed, assistance 
being sought also in relation to other needs of the civilian population. See generally OXFORD 
GUIDANCE, supra note 14, sec. C. 
17. For a discussion of whose consent is required and, in particular, whether, in the 
case of a non-international armed conflict it is always that of the affected State as a matter 
of law or, in some circumstances, that of non-State groups in control of territory, see OX-
FORD GUIDANCE, supra note 14, sec. D; Gillard, supra note 3. 
18. GC IV, supra note 10, art. 59. 
19. In addressing the situation in Syria, in 2014 the Security Council authorized UN 
humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners to deliver humanitarian assistance 
to people in need, across conflict lines and through specified border crossings without 
requiring the consent of the Syrian government or of other parties to the conflict. S.C. 
Res. 2165, ¶ 2 (July 14, 2014). 
20. AP I, supra note 11, arts. 70(2)–(4); 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW, supra note 13, r. 55, cmt. at 194–200; OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 14, sec. F. 
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III.   THE REQUIREMENT OF CONSENT 
 
The principal element of complexity in these otherwise simple rules is the 
requirement of consent. While States and humanitarian organizations may 
offer their services, consent is required before humanitarian relief opera-
tions may be implemented. This requirement of consent is explicit in both 
Article 70(1) of AP I (which provides that such operations “shall be 
undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief 
actions”) and Article 18(2) of AP II (such operations “shall be undertaken 
subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned”). 
Despite the apparently absolute nature of the requirement that consent 
be obtained, it has been accepted that such consent may not be withheld 
arbitrarily. This principle prohibiting arbitrary withholding of consent is 
derived from (1) the need to provide an effective interpretation of the rele-
vant treaty texts, which gives effect to all aspects of those provisions and 
does not render parts of them redundant; (2) the intention of those who 
negotiated the Additional Protocols, as reflected in the drafting history of 
the provisions; and (3) practice subsequent to the adoption of the proto-
cols. In other words, the principle prohibiting arbitrary withholding of con-
sent to humanitarian relief operations, where the preliminary conditions for 
such operations to be undertaken are met, derives from the interpretation 
of the relevant treaty texts which best accords with the relevant provisions 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.21  
The texts of Article 70 of AP I and of Article 18(2) of AP II dealing 
with humanitarian relief operations include a number of distinct elements, 
all of which make up the package of rules contained in those provisions. 
These texts state that where the civilian population is inadequately provid-
ed with essential supplies, relief actions that are humanitarian and impartial 
in character and conducted without any adverse distinction “shall be under-
taken.” However, these operations are also stated to be “subject to the 
agreement/consent” of the State concerned in such relief actions. While 
that last phrase makes it clear that consent is required, the use of the word 
“shall” also suggests that acceptance of humanitarian relief is not entirely 
discretionary. To interpret the provisions in such a way as to ignore the 
requirement of consent entirely, or, alternatively to insist on an unlimited 
                                                                                                                  
21. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31, 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
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right of the State to withhold consent, would fail to give effect to one or 
other aspect of the provision. Interpreting the texts in a manner which in-
sists on the requirement of consent but which also requires that such con-
sent must not be withheld arbitrarily, gives effect to both aspects of the 
provision.22 Such an interpretation is consistent with the principle that a 
treaty must not be interpreted in such a way as to render parts of the text 
redundant or meaningless.23 It also accords with the principle that a treaty 
must be interpreted in good faith, a principle that in turn requires the bal-
ancing of treaty elements and excludes abuse of rights.24 
The requirement that consent must not be withheld arbitrarily may also 
be derived from the drafting history of the Additional Protocols. The nego-
tiators expressed and supported the view that parties did not have “abso-
lute and unlimited freedom to refuse their agreement to relief actions.”25 A 
party refusing consent had to do so for “valid reasons,” not for “arbitrary 
or capricious ones.”26 According to a leading commentator, who participat-
                                                                                                                  
22. To the same effect, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED 
CONFLICTS 25 (2011), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-moveme 
nt/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf. 
23. This is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). See Application 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2011 I.C.J. 70, ¶¶ 133–34 (Apr. 11). 
See also Appellate Body Report, Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Import of Certain Dairy 
Products, ¶ 81, WTO Doc. WT/DS98/AB/R (adopted Dec. 14, 1999) (“In the light of the 
interpretive principle of effectiveness, it is the duty of any treaty interpreter to ‘read all ap-
plicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of them, harmoniously.”’ 
(emphasis in original)). See RICHARD K. GARDNER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 179–81 (2d 
ed. 2015). 
24. See GARDNER, supra note 23, at 176–79. 
25. 12 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS 336, ¶ 27 (1978) (statement of Michael Bothe representative of Ger-
many) [hereinafter 12 OFFICIAL RECORDS]; 4 HOWARD LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR 
VICTIMS: PROTOCOL 1 TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 15 (1981). 
26. LEVIE, supra note 25, at 15; 12 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 25, at 336, ¶ 27. 
This position was supported by the United States, the Netherlands, the USSR and the UK. 
No delegations opposed this understanding. Id. at 336–37, ¶¶ 28–31. Similar comments 
were also made in relation to the consent requirement in Article 18 of Additional Protocol 
II. 7 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS 156–57 (1978) (Belgium and Germany). See also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDI-
TIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 
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ed in the negotiations, an interpretation that does justice to both the re-
quirement that humanitarian relief actions be undertaken and the require-
ment of consent, is that consent “has to be granted as a matter of principle, 
but that it can be refused for valid and compelling reasons. Such reasons 
may include imperative considerations of military necessity. However, there 
is no unfettered discretion to refuse agreement, and it may not be declined 
for arbitrary or capricious reasons.”27 
Finally, despite the absence of specific words in the relevant treaty 
texts, it is now generally accepted that although the consent of the affected 
State to humanitarian relief actions is required, it may not be arbitrarily 
withheld.28 This position is reflected in subsequent formulations of the 
rules on humanitarian assistance that expressly note that consent may not 
be arbitrarily withheld. Examples include the Guiding Principles on Inter-
nal Displacement;29 the Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance adopted by 
the Institute of International Law in 2003;30 Council of Europe Recom-
                                                                                                                  
1949, ¶¶ 2805, 4885 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 
1987).  
27. MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES 
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS AD-
DITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 485 (2d ed. 2013) (quoting Mi-
chael Bothe). 
28. See, e.g., 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 13, r. 
55, cmt. at 194–200; Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2013, supra note 1, ¶ 58; Felix 
Schwendimann, The Legal Framework of Humanitarian Access in Armed Conflict, 93 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 993, 999 (2011). 
29. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement state that 
 
[i]nternational humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have the right to 
offer their services in support of the internally displaced. Such an offer shall not be re-
garded as an unfriendly act or an interference in a State’s internal affairs and shall be con-
sidered in good faith. Consent thereto shall not be arbitrarily withheld, particularly when 
authorities concerned are unable or unwilling to provide the required humanitarian assis-
tance. 
 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 14, princ. 25.2. 
30. This resolution states that  
 
[a]ffected States are under the obligation not arbitrarily and unjustifiably to reject a bona 
fide offer exclusively intended to provide humanitarian assistance or to refuse access to the 
victims. In particular, they may not reject an offer nor refuse access if such refusal is likely 
to endanger the fundamental human rights of the victims or would amount to a violation 
of the ban on starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. 
 
Institute of International Law, Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance art. VIII (Sept. 2, 
2003), http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I318EN.pdf. 
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mendation 6 on internally displaced persons;31 and, beyond situations of 
armed conflict, in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) work on the 
protection of persons in the event of disasters,32 to mention but a few. 
While General Assembly Resolution 46/182 only refers to the need for the 
consent of the affected State, it is submitted that it should be read in the 
light of the above-mentioned rules and instruments requiring that consent 
not be arbitrarily withheld.  
With respect to offers of services by impartial humanitarian organiza-
tions, it has been stated that “international law as informed by subsequent 
State practice in the implementation of the Geneva Conventions has now 
evolved to the point where consent may not be refused on arbitrary 
grounds.”33 More generally, as indicated above, recent UN practice by the 
Security Council, General Assembly, Human Rights Council and UN Hu-
man Rights Committee has addressed the issue of the legality of obstruc-
tions to humanitarian access from the perspective of “arbitrary denial” of 
access, thus confirming the prohibition of arbitrary withholding of con-
sent.34 
 
IV.   WHAT AMOUNTS TO ARBITRARY WITHHOLDING OF CONSENT? 
 
A.   Preliminary Conditions 
 
Two conditions must be met before the issue of consent even arises. First, 
relief must be necessary, i.e., civilians must be inadequately provided with 
essential supplies and the party with responsibility to meet their needs must 
be failing to provide the requisite assistance. Second, the actor (State, inter-
national organization, non-governmental organization) offering its services 
must provide the assistance in a principled manner, that is the assistance 
must be exclusively humanitarian and impartial in character and carried out 
                                                                                                                  
31. Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2006)6 of the Committee of Ministers 
to Member States on Internally Displaced Persons, ¶ 4 (Apr. 5, 2006). 
32. ILC, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disaster, supra note 14, at 3 (art. 
13(2)). See also Sivakumaran, supra note 8. 
33. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GE-
NEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED 
AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶ 834 (2d ed. 2016), https://ihl-dat abas-
es.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6
CDFA490736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC#783_B. 
34. See supra notes 4–7. See also G.A. Res. 46/182, supra note 14, Guiding Principles, ¶ 
3. 
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without any adverse distinction.35 If these conditions are met, consent may 
not be arbitrarily withheld. 
 
B.   Criteria for Determining What Amounts to an Arbitrary Withholding of Consent 
 
Despite its centrality to the rules regulating humanitarian assistance, there is 
little clarity as to what constitutes arbitrary withholding of consent. There is 
no definition or guidance in any treaty and, to date, the issue has not been 
addressed by any international or national tribunal, human rights mecha-
nism36 or fact-finding body.  
The crucial task here is to try to identify what constitutes a valid and 
compelling reason for refusing consent to a humanitarian relief operation                                        
and what would be an arbitrary or capricious one. While there is no single 
or all-encompassing definition of arbitrariness, IHL, international human 
rights law (IHRL) and general principles of public international law provide 
guidance on the type of conduct that would justify the conclusion that an 
actor is acting arbitrarily in withholding consent to humanitarian relief op-
erations. 
Under international law, the notion of arbitrariness has a wide meaning 
and “is a much broader one than the ordinary meaning of the term might 
suggest.”37 In particular, it must not be thought that the concept is related 
solely, or even mainly, to conduct which is engaged in without reason, or is 
random. It has been stated that the UN Human Rights Committee has 
“never read ‘arbitrary’ . . . by its purely discretionary meaning, as referring 
to unrestrained decisions made purely by discretion or on whim, without 
any rational reason—a standard so low that it could be satisfied by having 
almost any rule allowing for the interference.”38 This position is equally true 
of other international tribunals that have considered the concept of arbi-
trariness. None of them have confined the notion of arbitrariness to deci-
                                                                                                                  
35. AP I, supra note 11, art. 70. See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 27, at 484–
85; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977, supra note 26, ¶ 
4883; Walter Kälin (Representative of the Secretary-General), Report on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. A/65/282 (Aug. 11, 2010). 
36. But see Fourth Periodic Report of the Sudan, supra note 7, ¶ 8(f) (which mentions, but 
does not elaborate on, “the prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access”). 
37. See Sivakumaran, supra note 8, at 519. 
38. See Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digi-
tal Age, 56 HARVARD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 81, 133 (2015). 
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sions made capriciously or on a whim.39 They have all taken a wider view, 
which relates to whether the conduct in question is justifiable in substance, 
as well as, in certain cases, whether the decision-making is procedurally ap-
propriate. While it is not always possible to capture in advance all the ele-
ments that may render an action or a decision arbitrary, certain key ele-
ments, which are discussed below, may be identified and provide a starting 
point for considering the issue of arbitrariness for the purpose of humani-
tarian relief operations. 
Essentially, consent is withheld arbitrarily if it is withheld in circum-
stances that violate a party’s other obligations under international law with 
respect to the civilian population in question; if it violates the principles of 
necessity and proportionality; or if it is withheld in a manner that is unrea-
sonable, unjust, lacking in predictability or otherwise inappropriate.40 
 
1.   Arbitrariness Deriving from Illegality under other Applicable Rules of 
International Law 
 
Although the concept of arbitrariness is broader than unlawfulness,41 where 
international law prohibits arbitrary action, conduct which would violate a 
party’s other obligations under international law is regarded as arbitrary.42 
                                                                                                                  
39. See, e.g., the decisions of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons 
case (infra note 45) and the World Trade Organization Appellate Body in Brazil—Retreaded 
Tyres (interpreting the concept of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” and stating 
“we believe that Brazil’s decision to act . . . [in this case] cannot be viewed as “capricious” 
or “random.”. . . “However, discrimination can result from a rational decision or behav-
iour, and still be ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable.’”). Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 232, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 
2007). 
40. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, Article 9: Liberty and 
Security of Person, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶¶ 11, 12 (Oct. 28, 2014) [hereinafter 
General Comment No. 35].  
41. See id.; SARAH JOSEPH & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 346, ¶ 11.11 (3d 
ed. 2013). 
42. See Kevin Boyle, The Concept of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 221, 234 (Bertrand Ramcharan ed., 1985) (speaking both of arbi-
trary deprivation of liberty and of life). In discussing the international law prohibition of 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality, the UN Secretary-General stated that “[m]easures lead-
ing to the deprivation of nationality must serve a legitimate purpose that is consistent with 
international law and, in particular, the objectives of international human rights law.” U.N. 
Secretary-General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/13/34 (Dec. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Secretary-General’s Report]. 
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This follows from the general principle according to which the interpreta-
tion of a treaty must be carried out taking into account “any relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”43 An 
example of a case in which the notion of arbitrariness was interpreted by 
reference to other applicable legal obligations is the International Court of 
Justice’s (ICJ) decision in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. Here the ICJ 
held that whether a deprivation of life is to be regarded as arbitrary under 
Article 6 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)44 in a situation of armed conflict must be determined by reference 
to the applicable principles of IHL.45 
Parties to an armed conflict must comply with all their applicable obli-
gations under international law. Of particular relevance in determining 
whether consent has been withheld arbitrarily are the obligations with re-
spect to the civilian population in need of assistance. It may be that the ef-
fect of those obligations under IHRL, international criminal law and other 
relevant bodies of law, in addition to IHL, is to require parties to accept 
humanitarian relief operations. In circumstances where the withholding of 
consent to humanitarian relief operations by a party to an armed conflict 
would amount to a violation of its other applicable obligations with respect 
to the civilian population in question, such withholding of consent would 
be arbitrary.46 
In sum, where the preliminary conditions for carrying out a humanitar-
ian relief operation are met, and denial of relief to those in need of it would 
amount to a breach by the affected State or party of its obligations under 
other relevant rules of international law with respect to the civilian popula-
tion in question, the withholding of consent must be considered arbitrary 
and, therefore, in violation of the rules regulating humanitarian relief opera-
tions. 47 
                                                                                                                  
43. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 31(3)(2). In its Oil 
Platforms decision the ICJ applied this provision in such a way that that it interpreted a 
bilateral Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights by reference to appli-
cable principles of the UN Charter and customary international law. Oil Platforms (Iran v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 41 (Nov. 6). 
44. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
45. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 25 (July 8). 
46. See infra Part IV for analysis of the relationship between IHRL and the rules of 
IHL relating to humanitarian relief operations. 
47. Kälin, Report on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, supra note 35, ¶ 82. 
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A non-exhaustive list of examples of arbitrary reasons for withholding 
consent that would violate obligations under international law in relation to 
the civilian population would include, first, the desire to weaken the re-
sistance of an adversary by depriving the civilian population of its means of 
subsistence.48 Where a civilian population is inadequately supplied and the 
State intends to cause, contribute to or perpetuate starvation, withholding 
consent to a humanitarian relief operation would amount to a violation of 
the prohibition of starvation of the civilian population as a method of war-
fare under Article 54(1) AP I and Article 14 AP II.49  
A second reason would be withholding consent to medical relief opera-
tions, including on the ground that medical supplies and equipment could 
be used to treat wounded enemy combatants. It is a fundamental rule of 
IHL that the wounded and sick—including enemy combatants—must re-
ceive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the 
medical care required by their condition.50 No distinction may be made on 
any grounds other than medical ones. Withholding consent to medical re-
lief operations and supplies, including on the ground that they might assist 
wounded and sick enemy combatants, would violate this rule. Moreover, 
the same equipment and supplies are also likely to be necessary for the ci-
vilian population, who would be denied the assistance to which it is entitled 
by law. 
Third, selective withholding of consent with the intent or effect of dis-
criminating against a particular group or section of the population would 
be arbitrary. An example would be systematically rejecting offers of hu-
manitarian assistance for crisis-affected regions populated by ethnic groups 
                                                                                                                  
48. Michael Bothe, Relief Actions: The Position of the Recipient State, in ASSISTING THE 
VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER DISASTERS 94 (Frits Kalshoven ed., 1988). 
49. See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977, supra 
note 26, ¶¶ 2808, 4885. The seriousness of withholding consent in such circumstances is 
evidenced by the fact that under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court it is 
a war crime in international armed conflicts to “intentionally us[e] starvation of civilians as 
a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including 
wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.” Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xxv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
Although not specified in the adopted version of the Elements of Crime for this of-
fense, delegations agreed that the crime would cover “the deprivation not only of food 
and drink, but also, for example, medicine or in certain circumstances blankets.” See KNUT 
DÖRMANN, ELEMENTS OF CRIME UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 363 (2003). 
50. See, e.g., AP I, supra note 11, art. 10; AP II, supra note 12, art. 17. 
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perceived as favoring the opposition.51 IHL prohibits adverse distinction 
founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other 
similar criteria;52 while under IHRL, discrimination on grounds of race, 
color, language, religion, national or social origin is prohibited.53 Further-
more, discriminatory conduct against any identifiable group or collectivity 
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, or religious grounds, when 
committed in connection with any other international crime may amount 
to the crime against humanity of persecution under the Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC).54  
Finally, and more generally, withholding of consent that is “likely to 
endanger the fundamental human rights” of the affected civilians will be 
arbitrary.55 Humanitarian assistance is also often considered from a human 
rights perspective, which requires withholding of consent not to violate 
particular rights, most notably the rights to bodily integrity, or prevent the 
satisfaction of the minimum core of relevant economic, social and cultural 
rights, such as the rights to an adequate standard of living, to food and to 
be free from hunger, to housing, and to health and medical services.56  
Limited guidance exists, however, as to the precise circumstances in 
which withholding consent would violate these rights. One of the most 
specific indications to date is that provided by the Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary-General on internally displaced persons: 
 
A State is deemed to have violated the right to an adequate standard of 
living, to health and to education, if authorities knew or should have 
known about the humanitarian needs but failed to take measures to satis-
fy, at the very least, the most basic standards imposed by these rights. 
                                                                                                                  
51. Kälin, Report on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, supra note 35, ¶ 83. 
52. GC I, supra note 16, art. 3; GC II, supra note 16, art. 3; GC III, supra note 16, arts. 
3, 16; GC IV, supra note 10, arts. 3, 13; AP I, supra note 11, art. 75(1); AP II, supra note 12, 
art. 4(2). 
53. ICCPR, supra note 44, arts. 2(1), 26; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights art. 2(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
54. ICC Statute, supra note 49, art. 7(1)(h). 
55. Institute of International Law Resolution, supra note 30, art. VIII (1). 
56. See, e.g., Walter Kälin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotation, 38 STUD-
IES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY 1, 117 (2008); Kälin, Report on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons, supra note 35, ¶¶ 68–69; SWISS FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS, HUMANITARIAN ACCESS IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT: HAND-
BOOK ON THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK ch. 4 (2011). In relation to assistance in natural 
disasters, see Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Report on the Protection 
of Persons in the Event of Disasters, ¶¶ 58–60, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/643 (May 11, 2011). 
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State obligations thus include the responsibility to follow up on these sit-
uations of concern and assess relevant needs in good faith, and ensure 
that humanitarian needs are being met, by the State itself or through 
available assistance by national or international humanitarian agencies and 
organizations, to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances and 
with the least possible delay.57 
 
Fuller analysis of the role that IHRL may play in determining whether con-
sent to humanitarian relief operations has been arbitrarily withheld is set 
out in Part V below. 
 
2.   Arbitrariness as a Failure to Comply with Principles of Necessity and 
Proportionality 
 
In contexts where international law prohibits arbitrary conduct, it has con-
sistently been stated that for conduct not to be arbitrary, not only must it 
be lawful, but it must also be necessary for achieving legitimate ends58 and a 
proportionate means of achieving those ends. The notions of necessity and 
proportionality described here are those that find expression in internation-
al human rights law. Human rights tribunals that have interpreted the no-
tion of arbitrariness (in the context of the right to life and the right to liber-
ty) have consistently held that the concept requires that the measure taken 
was necessary, no more than necessary and proportionate to the end 
sought to be achieved.59 Similarly, in the context of the prohibition of arbi-
trary deprivation of nationality, it has been stated that the conditions for 
not infringing the prohibition of arbitrariness include “serving a legitimate 
                                                                                                                  
57. Kälin, Report on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, supra note 35, ¶ 69. 
58. Sivakumaran, supra note 8, at 521. 
59. JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 41, at 169, ¶ 8.07 (referring to cases of the UN 
Human Rights Committee which hold that in order for use of lethal force to be non-
arbitrary and lawful, the use of firearms must be strictly unavoidable). See also A v. Austral-
ia, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 560/1993, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ 
59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 30, 1997) (where it was held that the element of proportionality is 
relevant in the context of assessing arbitrary deprivation of liberty). See generally JOSEPH & 
CASTAN, supra, at 168, ¶ 8.04; WALTER KÄLIN & JORG KUNZLI, THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 102 (2009) (“[T]he [Human Rights] Committee 
treats as ‘arbitrary’ all cases of interference with a right that are not reasonable or propor-
tionate in the circumstances, or, in other words, that are not proportional to the end 
sought and are not necessary in the circumstances of a given case.”). 
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purpose, being the least intrusive instrument to achieve the desired result 
and being proportional to the interest to be protected.”60 
Where consent to humanitarian relief operations is withheld because of 
imperative reasons of security, for example if foreign relief personnel could 
hamper military operations, it may be argued that the withholding of con-
sent is not arbitrary.61 However, such consent should not be withheld be-
yond what military necessity demands. Where it is, such a withholding 
would violate the principle that measures must not exceed that which is 
necessary. 
The principle of proportionality under IHRL can provide guidance on 
what would amount to arbitrary limitations on the granting of consent. 
Limitations in terms of time, duration, location, and affected goods and 
services must not go beyond what is absolutely necessary to achieve the 
legitimate aim of the State withholding consent.62  
 
3.   Arbitrariness as Unreasonableness or Capriciousness 
 
International tribunals that have been given the task of determining wheth-
er conduct by States is arbitrary have in varying contexts held that “‘arbi-
trariness’ is not simply to be equated with ‘against the law’ but must be in-
terpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, 
lack of predictability.”63 Furthermore, conduct will be regarded as arbitrary 
when it is unreasonable in all the circumstances.64 Applied to humanitarian 
                                                                                                                  
60. U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, ¶ 4, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/28 (2013). See also id. ¶ 40.  
61. BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 27, at 485; Bothe, supra note 48, at 95; Wal-
ter Kälin, UN Resident Coordinator Induction Programme (February 23, 2013) (on file 
with authors). 
62. Kälin, UN Resident Coordinator Induction Course, supra note 61. 
63. See, e.g., Taright v. Algeria, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 1085/2002, ¶ 
8.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1085/2002 (May 16, 2006) (speaking about arbitrary dep-
rivation of liberty under ICCPR Article 9). This idea has been reiterated by the Human 
Rights Committee in many of its cases, such as A v. Australia, supra note 59, ¶ 9.2. See also 
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Produc-
tions, ¶ 180, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) (holding that a meas-
ure constituted “arbitrary discrimination” on the grounds, inter alia, of unpredictability). 
64. General Comment No. 35, supra note 40, ¶ 12. See also, e.g., Taright v. Algeria, supra 
note 63; A v. Australia, supra note 59. For a similar view, see Report of the Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/44 (Dec. 24, 2012). See also JOSEPH 
& CASTAN, supra note 41, at 168, ¶ 8.04 (Noting that the case law of the UN Human 
Rights Committee “confirms that ‘arbitrary’ is a broader concept than ‘unlawful’ . . . . The 
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relief operations, withholding of consent will be regarded as arbitrary or 
capricious if the reasons for withholding consent, though not inherently 
unlawful, fail to accord with the values that underpin IHL and IHRL. Also, 
withholding of consent will be arbitrary if the manner in which it is done 
leads to injustice or lack of predictability. 
While IHRL seeks to promote human dignity, IHL recognizes that in 
situations of armed conflict, a balance will need to be struck between the 
imperative considerations of security and the protection of humanitarian 
interests. As discussed in the previous section, withholding of consent on 
grounds of imperative reasons of security might not be arbitrary, provided 
the measures taken comply with the principles of necessity and proportion-
ality. Examples of reasons for withholding consent which fall into the cate-
gory of inappropriate or unreasonable, and thus be arbitrary, would be 
withholding of consent simply because of “State sovereignty, the internal 
legal order, national pride and/or interests, political orientation, the inter-
ests of the regime in power, and similar arguments.”65  
Where consent to assistance is withheld because the offer does not 
meet the preliminary conditions provided for by IHL, such a withholding 
of consent will not be arbitrary. Where a State or party is able to provide an 
adequate and effective response to the humanitarian needs from its own 
resources, such a denial of consent will not be in breach of its obligations 
under IHL with respect to relief operations, since those obligations only 
apply in cases where the party is unable to meet relevant needs. Also, even 
where there are unmet needs, if the actor offering its services will not pro-
vide the assistance in a principled manner—i.e., in a manner which is ex-
clusively humanitarian and impartial in character and carried out without 
any adverse distinction—it will not be arbitrary to refuse consent.66 
In addition, and as the ILC has noted in the area of consent to assis-
tance in the event of natural disasters, “withholding consent to assistance 
from one external source is not arbitrary if an affected State has accepted 
                                                                                                                  
prohibition on the ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life signifies that life must not be taken in un-
reasonable or disproportionate circumstances.”) Taking a similar view is the Secretary 
General’s Report, supra note 42, at 7, ¶ 25. 
65. Humanitarian Assistance, 70-I YEARBOOK OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 563 (Budislav Vukas, Rapporteur, 2002–2003). 
66. AP I, supra note 11, art. 70. See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 27, at 484–
85; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977, supra note 26, ¶ 
4883; Kälin, Report on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, supra note 35, ¶ 81. 
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appropriate and sufficient assistance from elsewhere.”67 However, where an 
offer of assistance that meets the preliminary conditions for relief opera-
tions is made and no alternate sources of assistance are available, there 
would be a strong presumption that a decision to withhold consent is 
arbitrary.68 These principles will apply equally to humanitarian relief opera-
tions in situations of armed conflict. 
An example of a withholding of consent that may be considered arbi-
trary because of the unreasonable or capricious manner in which it is done 
would be a rejection of offers of assistance without providing any reasons, 
or if the reasons are based on errors of fact, for example, a denial of hu-
manitarian needs without a proper assessment.69 It is unclear precisely to 
whom a party to a conflict is required to provide the reasons underlying its 
withholding of consent and, while it may not be under an obligation to re-
spond individually to each offer of humanitarian assistance, a blanket fail-
ure to provide reasons for withholding consent would be an example of 
lack of predictability and capriciousness which are indicators of arbitrari-
ness. A failure to provide reasons for withholding consent, in cases where 
the preliminary conditions for accepting offers of assistance appear to be 
met, would make it impossible to assess whether there are valid reasons 
underlying the refusal of consent. The obligation to provide reasons is a 
procedural obligation which allows the substantive obligations relating to 
humanitarian relief operations to be monitored and to be given effect. As 
the ILC has stated, again in the context of natural disasters, “[t]he 
provision of reasons is fundamental to establishing the good faith of an 
affected State’s decision to withhold consent. The absence of reasons may 
act to support an inference that the withholding of consent is arbitrary.”70 
However, the ILC has also “recognized that a rigid duty formally to 
respond to every offer of assistance may place too high a burden on 
affected States”71 and was of the view that maximum flexibility should be 
given to affected to States to decide how best to respond to offers of assis-
tance. It considered that there was “a wide range of possible means of 
                                                                                                                  
67. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Sixty-Third Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/66/10, at 270, ¶ 7 (2011) [hereinafter ILC Report]. 
68. Id. 
69. Kälin, Report on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, supra note 35, ¶ 82. 
See also Sivakumaran, supra note 8, at 519–21. 
70. ILC Report, supra note 67, at 270, ¶ 8. 
71. Id. at 270, ¶ 9. 
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response, including a general publication of the affected State’s decision 
regarding all offers of assistance.”72	  
 
C.   Concluding Remarks on Arbitrary Withholding of Consent 
 
In view of the above, the determination of whether consent has been with-
held for valid or arbitrary reasons must be made on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into consideration a number of inter-related elements, including: 
 
•   Compatibility with other obligations under international law with respect to 
the civilian population in question. If withholding consent amounts 
to a violation of the affected State’s other international obliga-
tions with respect to that civilian population, it will be arbitrary. 
Examples include violation of the prohibition of starvation of 
the civilian population as a method of warfare; the entitlement 
of the wounded and sick to receive to the fullest extent possi-
ble, and with the least possible delay, the medical care required 
by their condition; the prohibition of discrimination; or viola-
tion of the rights to bodily integrity, or the minimum core of 
relevant economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
•   Whether the withholding of consent is necessary and is not a disproportion-
ate means for achieving a legitimate objective. This may require consid-
ering the location of the proposed humanitarian relief opera-
tions; despite needs, a party may be entitled to withhold con-
sent to offers of assistance on certain grounds. For example, if 
the location of the intended operations is the theater of ongo-
ing hostilities. Other grounds would not be acceptable, for ex-
ample, if it is because the local population is viewed as support-
ive of the enemy. The timeframe of the proposed operations 
may also be relevant. What may constitute valid reasons for 
withholding access, such as ongoing hostilities or other reasons 
of security, could turn into arbitrary ones if their duration is 
such that the needs of the affected civilian population become 
severe. 
 
                                                                                                                  
72. Id. 
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•   Whether the withholding of consent is reasonable and pursues a legitimate 
objective. This will require consideration of a number of factors, 
including, first, the needs of the population—what are they in 
terms of types of supplies and services and how acute are they? 
Second, who, if anyone, is providing assistance? The starting 
point of the analysis is the needs of the civilian population, ra-
ther than any “entitlement” of relief organizations to provide 
assistance. If the affected State itself or some other humanitari-
an actor is providing the necessary assistance in a principled 
manner, the State may be entitled to turn down other offers of 
relief. Third, does the actor offering the assistance: have a rec-
ord of operating in a principled manner? And can it provide the 
type of assistance that is needed? 
 
V.   INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
OPERATIONS 
 
Although the rules on the conduct of humanitarian relief operations in sit-
uations of armed conflict are derived principally from IHL, as has already 
been noted, IHRL also contains rules that are relevant to the interpretation 
and application of the rules of IHL and may provide guidance in determin-
ing the circumstances in which consent is withheld arbitrarily. 
It is useful to recall that a State’s obligations under IHRL continue to 
apply in time of armed conflict. The ICJ has stated that “the Court consid-
ers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease 
in case of armed conflict . . . .”73 Moreover, a number of international tri-
bunals and/or mechanisms (the ICJ,74 the UN Human Rights Committee,75 
the European Court of Human Rights76 and the Inter-American Commis-
                                                                                                                  
73. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9). Some human rights treaties 
provide that States may take measures which derogate from some of their obligations in 
time of public emergency, including in time of armed conflict. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 
44, art. 4. 
74. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 73, ¶¶ 107–13. 
75. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ 
21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶ 10 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31]. 
76. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 62–64 (1995) (Preliminary Ob-
jections); Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07 (2011), (ECtHR), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105606; Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
27021/08 (2011), (ECtHR),  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105612. 
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sion on Human Rights77) have confirmed that a State’s human rights obli-
gations will continue to apply outside of that State’s sovereign territory 
where the State exercises effective control over the territory of another 
State, for example through occupation.78  
In time of armed conflict, IHL and IHRL are to be applied in a com-
plementary manner. As indicated in Part III, treaties are to be interpreted 
taking into account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties.”79 This principle of “coordinated interpreta-
tion” means that obligations under IHL and IHRL are to be applied in par-
allel and simultaneously. In particular, the principle of coordinated inter-
pretation means that obligations existing in one of these areas of law can be 
given content and be elaborated by reference to obligations of the State in 
the other area of law. This is particularly true in cases where the obligation 
uses concepts and notions of a general character—like “arbitrary”—that 
need to be given more specific content by reference to the circumstances 
of particular cases. The content of such notions depends on the interac-
tions between general principles animating the law and that particular sce-
nario being considered.  
An example of the complementary application of IHL and IHRL can 
be seen in the ICJ’s decision in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion to the 
effect that, in time of armed conflict, “[i]n principle, the right not arbitrarily 
to be deprived of one’s life . . . falls to be determined by the applicable lex 
specialis, namely the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to 
regulate the conduct of hostilities.”80 In other words, a breach by a State of 
its IHL obligations with regard to protection of life in time of armed con-
flict would amount to a breach of its IHRL obligation to respect the right 
to life. Moreover, the content of one obligation was determined by refer-
ence to obligations in the other area of law.  
With respect to humanitarian relief operations, IHRL provides guid-
ance on two issues. First, as developed in Part III, IHRL provides guidance 
in determining what is an arbitrary withholding of consent. Second, IHRL 
                                                                                                                  
77. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev., ¶ 37 (1999). 
78. See, e.g., General Comment 31, supra note 75, ¶ 10; Loizidou v. Turkey, supra note 76, 
¶¶ 62–64. On the extraterritorial application of human treaties, see generally MARKO MI-
LANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRIN-
CIPLES AND POLICY (2011). 
79. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 31(3)(c). 
80. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 45, ¶ 25. 
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provides guidance on the type of assistance that may validly be provided in 
humanitarian relief operations covered by IHL. With regard to the former, 
IHRL provides a more developed body of rules regarding arbitrariness 
which help to illuminate the scope and substance of this legal concept. 
With regard to the latter, IHRL establishes rules which provide substantive 
rights and obligations pertaining to humanitarian assistance that must be 
taken into account in interpreting and applying the rules of IHL on human-
itarian relief operations. In particular, the right to bodily integrity, including 
the right to life; the right to adequate food, clothing and housing; and the 
right to an adequate standard of living remain applicable in time of armed 
conflict and provide benchmarks for the interpretation and application of 
the relevant rules of IHL. 
 
A.   Arbitrariness under IHRL 
 
The notion of arbitrariness is one that is used in several areas of IHRL. For 
example, under the ICCPR States may not “arbitrarily” deprive individuals 
of their life or their liberty and may not engage in arbitrary interference 
with privacy, family, home or correspondence.81 
Where IHRL prohibits arbitrary conduct, the notion of arbitrariness 
has been interpreted to mean that the conduct in question includes ele-
ments of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability or due process 
of law, unreasonableness, or is otherwise unnecessary or disproportionate.82 
                                                                                                                  
81. See ICCPR, supra note 44, arts. 6, 9(1), 17(1). Although the European Convention 
on Human Rights, infra note 89, does not express these same rights by reference to arbi-
trariness, that Convention establishes rules that are practically equivalent to those on arbi-
trariness set out in the next paragraph.    
82. See General Comment No. 35, supra note 40, ¶¶ 11, 12; Suárez de Guerrero v. Co-
lombia, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. R.11/45, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/37/40) (1982) (with regard to the right to life); van Alphen v. Netherlands, Human 
Rights Committee, Comm. No. 305/1988, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988  (with 
regard to deprivation of liberty);  U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 
16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 21–22, ¶ 4 (July 29, 
2014) [hereinafter General Comment No. 16] (“The introduction of the concept of arbi-
trariness is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by law should be in 
accordance with the provisions, aims and objective of the Covenant and should be, in any 
event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.”); Toonen v. Australia, Human Rights 
Committee, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, ¶ 8.3 (1994) 
(“The Committee interprets the requirement of reasonableness to imply that any interfer-
ence with privacy must proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the circum-
stances of any given case.”).  
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Taking the case law of human rights tribunals into account, conduct will be 
regarded as arbitrary under IHRL, where it falls into one of the following 
categories:  
 
•   The conduct does not pursue a legitimate objective (which 
means an objective that is in accordance with the principles, 
aims and objectives of the law);83  
 
•   The measure taken is more than is necessary for the achieve-
ment of that legitimate aim;84 and  
 
•   There is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality be-
tween harm caused by the conduct and the aim sought to be 
achieved.85  
 
Thus, for the withholding of consent to a humanitarian relief operation to 
be lawful, consent must be withheld for a reason that accords with the 
principles, aims and objectives of the relevant IHL treaties. Withholding 
consent in furtherance of an objective that is at odds with IHL would not 
be consistent with the requirement that consent not be arbitrarily withheld.  
Although the concept of arbitrariness is not synonymous with a re-
quirement of legality,86 conduct that is aimed at achieving an unlawful pur-
                                                                                                                  
83. General Comment No. 16, supra note 82, ¶ 4 (arbitrariness indicates that interfer-
ence “should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objective of the Covenant”). 
84. Toonen v. Australia, supra note 82, ¶ 8.3 (the concept of arbitrariness means that in-
terference with rights must be reasonable and “the requirement of reasonableness” . . . 
impl[ies] that “any interference . . . must proportional to the end sought and be necessary 
in the circumstances of any given case”); van Alphen v. Netherlands, supra note 82, ¶ 5.8 (the 
prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty means that “remand in custody must be 
necessary in all the circumstances” to achieve certain permitted aims); Suárez de Guerrero v. 
Colombia, supra note 82, ¶ 13.2 (the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life meant in that 
case that action of the police must be necessary for self-defense, to effect arrest or to pre-
vent escape). 
85. Toonen v. Australia, supra note 82, ¶ 8.3; van Alphen v. Netherlands, supra note 82, ¶ 
5.8 (the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty means that remand in custody must 
“be reasonable in all the circumstances”). 
86. See General Comment No. 35, supra note 40, ¶¶ 11, 12. See also Elettronica Sicula 
SpA (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15, ¶ 124 (July 20). It should be noted 
that the ICJ was discussing illegality under national law as opposed to illegality under in-
ternational law. 
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pose will invariably be arbitrary or unreasonable.87 Therefore, if the reason 
for withholding consent to humanitarian relief operations is to achieve an 
aim that would violate the State’s other obligations under IHL or IHRL 
(e.g., starvation of the civilian population or discrimination against a partic-
ular group) or other rules of public international law, the refusal to consent 
will be deemed arbitrary. 
Furthermore, even where the State withholding consent may have legit-
imate grounds for doing so (perhaps imperative reasons of security), the 
measures it takes and their effect must comport with the principles of ne-
cessity and proportionality, and, therefore, must not exceed those that are 
strictly required. Accordingly, the broader the withholding of consent in 
terms of time, the areas covered, the affected populations and the relief 
operations precluded, the more likely it is to fall foul of the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality. 
 
B.   Humanitarian Assistance under IHRL 
 
In addition to the guidance that IHRL provides with regard to the content 
of arbitrariness, it should be recalled that IHRL also recognizes rights 
which, in turn, may impose substantive obligations on States to permit (and 
certainly not to prevent) the conduct of humanitarian relief operations. 
Denial by States of access to materials which are essential for survival will 
be a violation of the right to life,88 which is non-derogable and, therefore, 
applicable in time of armed conflict.89  
                                                                                                                  
87. Oliver Corten, Reasonableness in International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 17 (2013), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law: 
epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1679?prd=EPIL. 
88. In 1982, the UN Human Rights Committee noted that the right to life cannot 
properly be understood in a restrictive matter and that protection of the right requires 
States to adopt positive measures, e.g., elimination of malnutrition and epidemics. Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No 6: Article 6 (The Right to Life), U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 7, ¶ 5 (July 29, 1994). See also KÄLIN & KUNZLI, supra note 59, at 
303 (“The scope of human-rights-based protection of life is not confined to minimizing 
the risk of being killed. Access to the basic necessities of life, such as food, shelter and, in 
the case of life-threatening health problems, minimum medical treatment is equally rele-
vant if not even more important for survival in situations where such access is being 
blocked or where basic goods are simply not available.”). 
89. ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 4(2). Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the right to life is derogable only in respect of lawful acts of war. Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222. 
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Similarly, the rights provided for in the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) continue to apply in time 
of armed conflict and will inform the obligation to accept humanitarian 
relief operations, as well as the content of such operations. Unlike the IC-
CPR, the ICESCR does not have a derogations clause. Moreover, the ICJ 
has confirmed that the provisions of this treaty continue to apply in armed 
conflict, including occupation.90 
Under the ICESCR, everyone has a right to an adequate standard of 
living, including adequate food, clothing and housing. In addition, under 
Article 12(1), States parties recognize “the right of everyone to the enjoy-
ment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 
Although these rights are to be achieved progressively, there are elements 
of the rights that entail immediate obligation for States, including States 
involved in armed conflict. These rights, like others, impose three types of 
obligations on States: to respect, to protect and to fulfill.  
The elements of the rights provided for under the ICESCR relevant to 
humanitarian relief operations in times of armed conflict may be summa-
rized as consisting of the following obligations: (i) obligations of availabil-
ity—there is a duty make the object of the right (food, water, health ser-
vices, shelter etc.) available; (ii) the obligation of accessibility—the objects 
of the right have to be accessible to everyone without discrimination on 
unjustifiable grounds; and (iii) the obligation of acceptability and quality—
the object of the rights must be culturally acceptable and of sufficient quali-
ty. 91 
With respect to the right to food (which also includes the right to wa-
ter), the obligation entails respect for existing access to adequate food, 
which also encompasses an obligation not to take measures that result in 
preventing such access. The obligation to protect requires that States take 
measures to ensure that individuals are not deprived of access to adequate 
food by other actors. The obligation to fulfill includes an obligation to fa-
cilitate access to food, and, in certain circumstances, an obligation to pro-
vide adequate food. Despite the progressive nature of some of these obli-
gations, States have an obligation to make every effort to ensure the mini-
mum essential level required to be free from hunger.92 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                  
90. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 74, ¶¶ 106, 112. 
91. See KÄLIN & KUNZLI, supra note 59, at 304. 
92. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12: The 
Right to Adequate Food (Art.11), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter 
General Comment 12]. 
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated that if a 
State claims that resource constraints make it impossible to provide access 
to food for those who are unable by themselves to secure such access, it 
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all the resources 
at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations, including that it has unsuccessfully sought to obtain interna-
tional support to ensure the availability and accessibility of the necessary 
food.93 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also stat-
ed that it would be a violation of the right to food for a State to prevent 
humanitarian food aid in time of armed conflict.94 Also, unjustifiable dis-
crimination in providing or permitting access to food would be a violation 
of a State’s obligations under the ICESCR.95 
The Committee has, in the course of its examination of States’ obliga-
tions under the ICESCR, made concrete findings to the effect that depriv-
ing civilians of access to food and humanitarian assistance in a situation of 
armed conflict amounted to a violation of the right to food. For example, 
in its 2010 concluding observations on the report of Sri Lanka the Com-
mittee expressed: 
 
[D]eep concern about allegations according to which during the last 
months of the armed conflict in 2009, civilians were deliberately deprived 
of food, medical care and humanitarian assistance which constitute viola-
tions of article 11 of the Covenant as well as of the international humani-
tarian prohibition of starvation and may amount to a war crime. (art.11) 
                                                                                                                  
93. Id. ¶ 17. See also ETO Consortium, Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obli-
gation of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2013), http://www. 
etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1 
%5BdownloadUid%5D=23. Principle 34 provides that “[a] State has the obligation to 
seek international assistance and cooperation on mutually agreed terms when that State is 
unable to, despite its best efforts, to guarantee economic, social and cultural rights within 
its territory.” 
94. General Comment 12, supra note 92, ¶ 19. (“Violations of the right to food can 
occur through the direct action of States or other entities insufficiently regulated by States. 
These include . . . the prevention of access to humanitarian food aid in internal con-
flicts.”). 
95. Id. ¶ 18 (“[A]ny discrimination in access to food, as well as to means and entitle-
ments for its procurement, on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, age, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status with the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise of economic, 
social and cultural rights constitutes a violation of the Covenant.”). 
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In light of its general comment No.12 (1999) on the right to adequate 
food, the Committee draws the attention of the State party to the fact 
that the prevention of access to humanitarian food aid in internal con-
flicts constitutes a violation of article 11 of the Covenant as well as a 
grave violation of international humanitarian law.96 
 
In summary, IHRL provides guidance with respect to the concept of arbi-
trariness, supplying elements for identifying conduct that falls within the 
scope of that concept. IHRL also provides substantive obligations that are 
complementary to the obligations under IHL with regard to humanitarian 
relief operations. These obligations provide additional content that are to 
be applied together with the obligations under IHL. 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
This article has sought to show that although the consent of concerned 
States is, in most cases, required for the conduct of humanitarian relief op-
erations, those States do not have complete liberty as to whether to grant 
consent. Where consent is required, it may not be arbitrarily withheld. Al-
though the rule prohibiting arbitrary withholding of consent does not ap-
pear on the face of the relevant treaty texts, it can be derived not only from 
the drafting history of those treaties, but also from the need to give an ef-
fective and balanced meaning to the different elements of those texts. Fur-
thermore, the principle is reflected in subsequent practice and is implicit in 
the many recent statements regarding “arbitrary denial of humanitarian ac-
cess.” 
The article has also sought to elaborate on what it means to withhold 
consent arbitrarily in the context of humanitarian relief operations. Draw-
ing on the meaning attributed to arbitrariness in other areas of international 
law, most notably, in international human rights law, it has been demon-
strated that the concept is by no means confined to conduct which is car-
ried out on a whim or without reason. Instead, it is suggested that consent 
is withheld arbitrarily when the withholding would result in a violation of 
the State’s international law obligations with respect to the civilian popula-
tion, when the withholding violates the principles of necessity and propor-
tionality, and when it would be unreasonable or capricious. 
                                                                                                                  
96. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observa-
tions: Sri Lanka, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/LKA/CO/2-4, ¶ 28 (Dec. 9, 2010). 
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By examining the existence and meaning of a rule requiring that con-
sent for humanitarian relief operations not be arbitrarily withheld, this arti-
cle has taken only the first steps with regard to exploration of the concept 
of “arbitrary withholding of consent.” Since such action is prohibited by 
the relevant rules of international law, questions also arise as to conse-
quences that may follow when consent is arbitrarily withheld. Inevitably 
questions of responsibility arise, not only for the party that is withholding 
consent, but also, under international criminal law97 and relevant Security 
Council resolutions,98 for individuals involved in such conduct. Further-
more, consideration needs to be given to the lawfulness of humanitarian 
relief operations conducted in the face of arbitrary withholding of consent. 
Although it has been asserted that “[w]here consent is withheld for . . . ar-
bitrary reasons, the relief operation is lawful without consent,”99 more care-
ful analysis of the legal basis, if any, for such operations is necessary.100 In 
so far as humanitarian relief operations are conducted without consent and 
are therefore inconsistent with the rules protecting the territorial integrity 
of States, an assessment of the permissibility of such operations will de-
pend on analysis of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness in the law 
of State responsibility.101 
                                                                                                                  
97. For example, under Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court, “[i]ntentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving 
them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies 
as provided for under the Geneva Conventions” is a war crime. Although, the ICC Statute 
provides for this crime only in international armed conflicts, there are strong arguments 
that suggest that under customary international law this is a war crime in both internation-
al and non-international armed conflicts. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW, supra note 13, r. 156, cmt. at 599, 603. 
98. In a number of cases, UN Security Council resolutions list obstruction of humani-
tarian activities or of access to humanitarian assistance as one of the grounds on which 
targeted sanctions may be imposed on individuals or groups. S.C. Res. 1844, ¶ 8(c) (Nov. 
20, 2008) (in relation to Somalia); S.C. Res. 1857), ¶ 4(f) (Dec. 22, 2008) (in relation to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo); S.C. Res. 2134, ¶ 37(e) (Jan. 28, 2014) (in relation to 
the Central African Republic); S.C. Res. 2206, ¶ 7(f) (Mar. 3, 2015) (in relation to South 
Sudan); S.C. Res. 2216, supra note 6,  ¶ 19 (in relation to Yemen). 
99. Nicolas Bratza et al., Letter to the Editor, There is No Legal Barrier to UN Cross-
border Operations in Syria, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 29, 2014, at 35, https://www.theguardi 
an.com/world/2014/apr/28/no-legal-barrier-un-cross-border-syria. 
100. For an analysis of these issues, see OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 14, sec. I. 
101. The position of private actors on the one hand is different from that of States 
and international organizations on the other since the former are not bound by the inter-
national law rule relating to territorial integrity. See OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 14, 
sec. I. 
